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DENIAL OF HOPE: SENTENCING CHILDREN TO
LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF
PAROLE
ASHLEY KLOEPFER
INTRODUCTION
The Human Rights Watch estimates that over 2,225 juveniles (age
seventeen and younger) in the United States are serving life in prison
without the possibility of parole.1 Effectively, life in prison without parole
condemns a child to die in prison. Short of the death penalty, life in prison
without parole ("LWOP") is the harshest sentence that may be imposed on
a criminal offender. The imposition of LWOP on a child ignores the
modern behavioral and scientific understanding that children have
tremendous potential for growth and maturity as they move from
adolescents to adulthood. Historically, very few countries have punished
juveniles by sentencing them to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. Currently, the United States is now responsible for nearly 100% of
all child offenders serving life in prison without parole, for both homicide
and non-homicide offenses. 2 However, a Supreme Court decision, Graham
v. Florida, in May of 2010, declared that life in prison without parole for
juvenile non-homicide offenses is a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 3 Life in prison without parole is still
I Equal Justice Initiative, Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing 13- and 14-Year-Old Children to Die in
Prison (2007), http://www.eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf; ALISON PARKER, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL & HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR
CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us1005/.
2 Paolo G. Annino et al., Juvenile Life without Parole for Non-Homicide Offenses: Florida
Compared to Nation, (September 14, 2009),
http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/Reportjuvenile _wop 092009.pdf, Human Rights
Watch, US: End Life Sentences for Youth Offenders, (May 7, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/07/us-end-life-sentences-youth-offenders.
3 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, **2030 (2010); Adam Liptak, Weighing Life in Prison for
Youths Who Didn't Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2
009/11/08/us/08juveniles.html. Most of the 109 juvenile offenders serving life without parole for non-
homicide crimes reside in Florida. The breakdown of juveniles serving LWOP in the United States is as
follows: California, four; Nevada, one; Iowa, six; Louisiana, seventeen; Mississippi, two; Delaware,
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permissible for juvenile homicide offenders.
In the 2009 term, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of
sentencing juveniles to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
non-homicide offenders. In Sullivan v. Florida4 and Graham v. Florida,5
both of the petitioners were sentenced to life without parole as juveniles
and argued that this sentence was a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 6 In
Sullivan, a 13-year-old was charged and convicted of raping 72-year-old
Lena Bruner in her home. After a one-day trial, and without any DNA
evidence, Sullivan was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole.7 In Graham, a 16 year old was charged and
convicted of committing armed burglary and attempted robbery of a
Jacksonville restaurant.8 At this time, Graham was not sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole, but instead was released and sentenced to
a period of probation.9 However, weeks before his eighteenth birthday, he
and older accomplices committed an armed home invasion.10 During
sentencing, the judge rejected the Department of Corrections'
recommendation of a four-year sentence,11 and instead sentenced Graham
to life in prison without the possibility of parole after stating "[y]ou've
evidently decided this is the direction you're going to take in life."' 2
Part I of this Note examines the Eighth Amendment and its effect on
juvenile sentencing. Part II discusses the abundance of scientific and
behavioral evidence indicating that children are inherently less culpable
than adults and argues that a different sentencing scheme should be adopted
which acknowledges these differences. Part III suggests that the holding in
Graham, which makes LWOP inapplicable to non-homicide offenders,
should be expanded to include juveniles who commit homicide offenses.
Specifically, part III seeks to demonstrate that both the national and
international consensus, as well as recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,
one; South Carolina, one; and Florida, seventy-seven. Of the 109 incarcerated individuals, 51% were
seventeen at the time of the offense, 31% were sixteen at the time of the offense, and 18% were
between the ages of 13 and 15 at the time of the offenses.
4 Sullivan v. Florida, 987 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2008).
5 Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2008).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VIll.
7 Sullivan, 987 So. 2d at 83. This charge was Joe Sullivan's first felony but the judge declared that
the boy was "beyond help" and sentenced him to life without parole; see Equal Justice Initiative,
Sullivan v. Florida/Graham v. Florida
8 Graham, 982 So. 2d at 45.
9 Id.
10 Id.
I I Id.
12 Id at 46.
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would prohibit the imposition of such a sentence. Part IV showcases
alternative sentencing schemes adopted by the state of Louisiana, as well as
those adopted by other nations, which prohibit imposing life in prison
without parole on juvenile offenders.
I. THE CURRENT REGIME: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND JUVENILE
SENTENCING
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." 13 This Amendment proscribes "all
excessive punishment, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may
or may not be excessive."l 4 The protection against cruel or unusual
punishments "flows from the basic 'precept of justice that punishment for
[a] crime should be graduated and proportional to the offense."' 15 The
Eighth Amendment draws its meaning from "the evolving standards of
decency that mark a maturing society."16 Although the Constitution does
not define or provide any guidance on what constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment, the drafters intended the provision to prohibit, at minimum,
the forms of punishment banned at the time the Constitution was adopted. 17
The Supreme Court has stated that "[b]y protecting even those convicted of
heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the
government to respect the dignity of all persons."18 However, sentencing
juveniles to life in prison starkly contradicts respect for the dignity of all
persons. Effectively, a child serving LWOP is sentenced to die in prison.
A LWOP sentence, and its unique effect on juveniles, raises both legal and
moral questions.19 In some states, judges who imposed "death in prison
sentences" on young children were required to do so as they had to respect
a state statute so requiring. As a result of being bound by such laws, the
majority of children sentenced to LWOP were condemned to die in prison
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the death penalty for child rape is
unconstitutional and in violation of the 8th Amendment).
15 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
16 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005).
17 Id. at 609; see John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (2008).
18 Id. at 560.
19 Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 1. See Leslie P. Wallace, "And ! Don't Know Why it is that
You Threw Your Life Away": Abolishing Life Without Parole, The Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida
Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 61
(2010).
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by mandatory sentencing laws that precluded the judge from considering
the child's age, maturity, or capacity for change. 20 Children are uniquely
vulnerable and impositions of such a sentence ignore a child's capacity for
growth, change, and most importantly rehabilitation.
The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899. The juvenile
court was established in response to the notion that punishments designed
for adults were too harsh when applied to juveniles. 21 These juvenile courts
recognized the developmental differences between adults and children,
which resulted in a system focused on rehabilitation rather than a purely
penal model. However, since the establishment of the first juvenile courts,
attitudes towards juvenile justice have changed with drastic pendulum
swings. 22 Most recently, the attitude towards juvenile justice reflects a
focus on retribution and harsher sentencing. 23 Those who believe in harsher
sentencing for juvenile offenders believe that children who committed
violent offenses need more than a "slap on the wrist" from juvenile
courts.24 Additionally, such advocates find it "nalve to continue to rely on a
juvenile system designed for a simpler era, when children were getting into
fistfights in the schoolyard." 25 Now, juveniles are committing heinous and
violent crimes, like murder and rape, at a far greater rate than in the past.26
Yet the juvenile court system was built upon the idea that children are
different from adults, in a way that makes them less culpable for their
actions.27
In juvenile courts judges have wide discretion to refer a juvenile to the
20 Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 1. "In some states, 13 and 14 year olds are subjected to the
harshest possible prison sentence, despite widespread acknowledgment by experts, parents, teachers,
doctors and courts that children tend to be incapable of making mature choices, that they are vulnerable
to negative influences and peer pressure, and that they are powerless to protect themselves from
dysfunctional and dangerous home environments." Anthony C. Thompson, Clemency for Our Children,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2641, 2649 (2011).
21 Sameer P. Sarkar, MD, LLM, To Young to Kill? U.S. Supreme Court Treads a Dangerous Path
in Roper v. Simmons, J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 35: 364-72 (2002); available at,
http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/full/35/3/364; Emily Buss, Review: Rethinking the Connection
between Developmental Science and Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 500 (2009).
22 Sarkar, supra note 21; Mark H. Moore & Stewart Wakeling, Juvenile Justice: Shoring Up the
Foundations, 22 CRIME & JUST. 253, 263 (1997).
23 Id.; Javier M. Vazquez, Appropriate Treatment for Juvenile Offenders: Juvenile Justice System
v. Jury System, I BARRY L. REV. 185, 211 (2000).
24 Macarthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Dev. & Juvenile Justice, Issue Brief 3,
Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue brief 3.pdf; Marla
Slaten, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court: Whose Right is it Anyway, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 821, 822-
23 (2003).
25 Id.
26 Id.; Hon. John B. Leete, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit Adult Crimes:
Treatment and Rehabilitation or Hard Time: Is the Focus of Juvenile Justice Changing?, 29 AKRON L.
REV. 491,493 (1996).
27 Id.; Wallace, supra note 19, at 61.
390
DENAL OF HOPE
adult criminal court. In Kent v. United States,28 the Supreme Court held
that the following factors should be considered before a juvenile may be
tried as an adult: "the seriousness and type of offense and the manner in
which it was committed; the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as
determined by consideration of his or her home life, environmental
situation, and emotional attitude; the juvenile's record and history; and the
prospects for protecting the public and rehabilitating the juvenile." 29 After
weighing these factors, a juvenile may be tried as an adult and subsequently
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 30 However,
nineteen states currently allow automatic transfers of a child to adult court
when the child is accused of certain crimes. 31 This means, in effect, that
judges do not have the opportunity to weigh any factors, such as the child's
age, background, involvement in the crime, or other mitigating
circumstances, before sentencing the child as an adult.32 In yet another
twenty-one states a sentence of life in prison without parole is mandatory33
for certain crimes. 34 Some states reserve discretion to the sentencing
judge. 35 While forty-three states have LWOP as a statutory sentence for a
juvenile, only thirty-eight states actually impose the LWOP sentence on
juveniles in practice. 36 However, as noted by the Court in Graham, the
28 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1996).
29 Id. at 566-67.
30 Id. at 547; See Connie De La Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in
Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 983, 990 (2008).
31 Human Rights Watch, Letter from Human Rights Organization to CERD regarding Juvenile Life
Without Parole in the US, Jun. 4, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/04/letter-human-rights-
organizations-cerd-regarding-juvenile-life-without-parole-us#_ftn8 [hereinafter Letter]; see Christine
Chamberlin, Not Kids Anymore: A Need for Punishment and Deterrence In the Juvenile Justice System,
42 B.C. L. REV. 391,401 (2001).
32 Letter, supra note 31; see Brian G. Sellers & Bruce Arrigo, Adolescent Transfer, Developmental
Maturity, and Adjudicative Competence: An Ethical and Justice Policy Inquiry, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 435, 440-41 (2008).
33 Letter, supra note 31. The term "mandatory" means judges have no option other than to sentence
youth offenders to LWOP upon conviction for at least one type of offense. Most often that offense is
first degree murder. The Coalition for the Fair Sentencing of Children, Submission by the Coalition for
the Fair Sentencing of Children to the ABA's Juvenile Justice Committee's Town Hall Meeting,
November 6, 2008, www.youthlaw.org/...justice/.. Submission toABA Nov_6.pdf (last visited Sept.
14, 2011) [hereinafter Submission by the Coalition].
34 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034-36 Appendix. The states with mandatory sentencing
laws are as follows: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. While California does not have mandatory sentencing, they have a LOWP
presumption. Submission by the Coalition, supra note 33.
35 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034-36 Appendix. The states that reserve sentencing discretion for the
judge are as follows: Arizona, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Submission by the
Coalition, supra note 33.
36 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034-36 Appendix. These five states include: Maine, New Jersey, New
3912012]
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"many States that allow life without parole for juvenile non-homicide
offenders[,] but do not impose the punishment[,] should not be treated as if
they have expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate." 37 On the
other hand, Alaska, Colorado,38 Kansas, Kentucky, and Texas flatly ban the
imposition of life in prison without parole for juveniles.39 There are only
six states that permit life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders
convicted of homicide offences: Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New Mexico. 40 While the Supreme Court
in Graham expressly stated that the Court's decision applies only to those
offenders who committed non-homicide offenses, 41 the behavioral and
scientific research supports the proposition that children are inherently less
culpable regardless of the crime committed.
II. MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL FINDINGS
The existence of a juvenile justice system rests on two fundamental
assumptions about adolescents: "(1) that they are less capable of mature
judgment than adults and are therefore less culpable for any offenses that
they commit; and (2) that they are more amenable to treatment than adults,
and therefore are more likely to profit from rehabilitation." 42 In most states,
children cannot get married or obtain a driver's license without reaching a
certain age delineated by the state. State laws mandate that children attend
school until reaching a certain age and they punish adults who fail to
adequately provide and care for their children. Such laws treat adolescents
differently because they are different. "Scientists have revealed that
adolescents' brains are anatomically undeveloped in parts of the cerebrum
associated with impulse control, regulation of emotions, risk assessment,
and moral reasoning."43 Often, very serious juvenile offenses result in
demands for long and harsh periods of incarceration. 44 However, such
York, Vermont, and West Virginia. Submission by the Coalition, supra note 33.
37 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
38 Id. While Colorado has forty-eight juveniles serving life in prison without parole, the sentence
was declared unconstitutional in 2005. Submission to the Coalition, supra note 33.
39 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 Appendix; Submission to the Coalition, supra note 33.
40 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2035 Appendix; Submission to the Coalition, supra note 33.
41 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
42 Elizabeth Cauffiman, Ph.D & Laurence Steinberg, Ph.D, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, BEHAV. SC. & L. 18: 741, 741-42
(2000).
43 Parker, supra note 1; Sentencing Young Children to Die in Prison: Statement Before the
Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., H.R. 4300 (2008) (quoting Bryan A. Stevenson,
Executive Director, Equal Justice Initiative).
44 ABA 2008 Report with Recommendations #105C (2008); see Equal Justice Initiative, supra note
392
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demands may lead us to forget that no matter how adult-like the offense
may be, the juvenile is not an adult.45
"The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood." 46 Adolescence is defined as a
radical transformation, including the physical changes associated with
puberty (increases in height and weight, and sex- related changes) as well
as progressive gains in capacity for reasoned, mature judgment, impulse
control and autonomy.47 Children are driven towards behavior marked by
increased sensation seeking and risk taking.48 A study conducted with over
935 participants between the ages of ten and thirty examined the age
differences in sensation seeking and impulsivity. 49 In order to measure
sensation seeking, researchers developed a computerized driving game,
entitled Stoplight.50 In Stoplight, the player is asked to "drive" a simulated
car before time runs out to a location where a party is taking place.51
Participants are told that most people are able to reach the destination in
under two minutes. 52 From the vantage point of someone behind the wheel
of a car, minor drives down a road and towards the destination. 53 A clock,
set for two minutes and twenty seconds also appears on the screen. 54 The
participant hears the clock ticking down and "party music," which grows
increasing louder as the car approaches the destination. In order to reach
the destination, the driver goes through eight intersections.5 5 Each
1.
45 ABA 2008 Report with Recommendations #105C (2008); Michele LaVigne & Gregory J. Van
Rybroek, Breakdown in the Language Zone: The Prevalence of Language Impairments among Juvenile
andAdult Offenders and Why it Matters, 15 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 37 (2011).
46 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
47 Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and Cognitive Control,
93 Pharmacology, Biochemistry & Behavior 212, 212 (2009).
48 Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by
Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 Dev. Psychol. 1764, 1776 (2008);
see Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent Brain Development: A Period of Vulnerahilities and Opportunities,
Keynote Address, Ann. N.Y. Acad. Aci. 1021: 1-22, 7 (2004).
49 Steinberg, supra note 48, at 1764 ("Impulsivity refers to a lack of self-control or deficiencies in
response inhibition; it leads to hasty, unplanned behavior. Sensation seeking, in contrast, refers to the
tendency to seek out novel, varied, and highly stimulating experiences, and the willingness to take risks
in order to attain them").
50 Id. at 1767. The participants completed a two-hour assessment that consisted of a series of
computerized tasks, a set of computer-administered self-report measures, a demographic questionnaire,
several computerized tests of general intellectual function (e.g., digit span, working memory), and an IQ
assessment. Specifically, participants engaged in a computerized version of the Tower of London task
(used as a behavioral measure of impulsivity) and a computerized driving game ("Stoplight"; used as a
behavioral measure of sensation seeking).
51 Id. at 1768.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
2012] 393
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intersection has a traffic signal.56 At this point, a narrator informs the
participants that one of three things may happen, all depending on the
choice that the participant makes:
(a) [i]f the brakes are not applied and the car makes it through the
intersection, no time is lost; (b) if the brakes are applied before the
light turns red, the car will stop safely, but time will be lost waiting for
the light to cycle back to green (approximately 3 s[econds]); (c) if the
brakes are not applied or are applied too late, and the car crashes into
the crossing vehicle (this is accompanied by squealing tires and a loud
crash, as well as the image of a shattered windshield), even more time
will be lost (approximately 6 s[econds]) than had the participant
decided to brake. 57
Essentially, participants must decide whether to try to drive through the
intersection in order to save time and risk losing twice as much time if a
crash occurs or to stop and wait, and lose a smaller amount of time.58
To measure impulsivity, researchers utilized the computer generated
Tower of London game. The participant is presented with pictures of two
sets of three colored balls distributed across three rods, one of which can
hold three balls, the other two balls, and the last only one ball. 59 The first
picture shows the starting position of the three balls. The second picture
shows the goal position. 60 The participant's goal is to move the balls from
the starting position to the goal position in as few moves as possible.6l
The results of the study reflect that hasty performance, specifically with
the first moves made in the Stoplight and Tower of London games, has
been linked to "response inhibition difficulties" 62 among children,
adolescents, and adults.63 The research yielded evidence consistent with
previous neurobiological evidence. 64 In the results of the study, heightened
56 Id. ("Before playing the game, participants see a demonstration that is accompanied by
prerecorded audio instructions. Participants are informed that when they are approaching an
intersection, the traffic signal may turn yellow, and that, if this happens, they must decide whether to
stop the car [by using the space bar] and either wait for the light to cycle from yellow to red to green or
attempt to cross through the intersection. Participants are told that they cannot control the speed of the
car and that the only time the brake works is after the traffic light has tumed yellow. Participants are
told that if the car is driven through the intersection and the light tums red, there is a chance that it may
crash into another vehicle that is driving through at the same time").
57 Id. at 1769.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1768.
60 Id.
61 Id
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1774.
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sensation seeking, which was measured by Stoplight, increased between the
ages of twelve and fifteen.65 The study also found that gains in impulse
control occur in adolescence and early adulthood66 and a linear decline in
the measures of impulsivity from ages 10 through 30.67 Specifically, the
study noted that "[h]eightened vulnerability to risk taking in middle
adolescence may be due to the combination of relatively higher inclinations
to seek excitement and relatively immature capacities for self-control that
are typical of this period of development." 68
Adolescents' judgment is handicapped in nearly every conceivable way.
Children lack life experience and do not possess the knowledge to properly
inform their choices and decisions. 69 Adolescents struggle to generate
options, weigh those options, and reflect upon the consequences. 70
Adolescents lack the self-confidence to make reasoned judgments and act
on them.7 1 Notably, modem behavioral and psychological evidence reflects
that children are inherently less culpable than adults. Modem behavioral
and psychological research should be incorporated into our sentencing
schemes for juveniles, for this will ensure that children are not sentenced to
live out the remainder of their lives in prison.
A. Adolescents' Culpabability As Compared To The Average Adult
Offender
The Supreme Court has stated that, "less culpability should attach to a
crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an
adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended
65 Id. at 1774-75 ("The self-report and performance measures of sensation seeking, in contrast, did
not show entirely consistent results. On the self-report measure of sensation seeking, we find a
curvilinear trend similar to what others have hypothesized: increasing sensation seeking during early
adolescence, a peak around age 14 or 15, and a steady decline thereafter. On the driving game,
however, we see heightened sensation seeking during the period from 10 to 15 [with no increase
between 10 and 15], a sharp decline in middle adolescence, and no further decline after that. Whether
this difference is due to differences between self-report and performance measures of sensation seeking
in general or to differences between the specific measures used in this study [i.e., the driving game may
be tapping into other aspects of psychological functioning in addition to sensation seeking that develop
along a different timetable, or perhaps the onset of actual driving at age 16 contributes to more skillful
or cautious performance on the game] is not something that can be determined").
66 Id. at 1774.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1764.
69 Initial Brief: Petitioner-Appellant at 14-15, Sullivan v. State of Fla., 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (No.
08-7621); Leon Mann et al., Adolescent Decision-Making: the Development of Competence, 12 J.
ADOLESCENCE 265, 275 (1989).
70 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 758; Mann et al., supra note 69, at 269.
71 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 753; Mann et al.,supra note 69, at 273.
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explanation." 72 Culpability refers to the extent to which a person can be
considered blameworthy or deserving of punishment for his or her
behavior. 73 Evaluating one's culpability quite clearly involves a moral
judgment of the offender. As stated by Elizabeth Kaufman, Ph.D "if ...
moral standards [are]to be applied to offenders of varying levels of
maturity, it is important that evaluations of maturity (and subsequent
determinations of culpability) be grounded in an accurate understanding of
the factors that influence how adolescents make decisions." 74 According to
scientific and psychological research, young adolescents have not yet
developed the capacity to make mature and responsible decisions. 75 Society
presumes that youths are incapable of making mature decisions and that the
juvenile's ability to understand the consequences of his or her behavior is
diminished as compared to adults.76 This presumption results in the legal
regulation of minors. 77
Studies reflect that adolescents are less psychosocially mature than
adults in ways that affect their decision-making in antisocial situations.
These studies lend scientific credibility to the argument that juvenile
offenders may warrant special treatment because of a diminished sense of
responsibility. 78 Moreover, scientific research has established that
adolescents score lower on measures of self-reliance and other aspects of
personal responsibility, that they have more difficulty seeing things in long-
term perspective, that they are less likely to look at things from the
perspective of others, that they have more difficulty restraining their
aggressive impulses, and that they engage in a higher degree of sensation-
seeking behavior. 79 In a study of 1053 Danish youths (twelve and twenty
years of age), it was discovered that sensation seeking was related to most
types of risk behaviors.80 Such behaviors included sexual intercourse
72 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
73 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 742; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (9th ed. 2009).
74 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 742.
75 See id. at 753; Bonnie L. Halpem-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a
Decision: Decision-Making Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 257, 271 (2001).
76 See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 753; Mann et al., supra note 69, at 269-70.
77 Elizabeth Scott, N. Dickon Repucci & Jennifer Woolard, Evaluating Adolescent Decision
Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 228 (1995); see Adam Ortiz, Adolescence,
Brain Development and Legal Culpability ABA Juv. JUST. CTR. (Jan. 2004).
78 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 759; see Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1009,1013 (2003).
79 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 759; see Scott & Steinberg, supra note 78, at 1013.
80 Jeffrey Arnett & Lene Balle-Jensen, Cultural Bases of Risk Behavior: Danish Adolescents, 64
CHILD DEV. 1842, 1851 (1993); see Meg Gerrard, Prevalence Estimates and Adolescent Risk Behavior:
Cross-Cultural Diference in Social Influence, 80 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 107, 107 (1995).
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without contraception, marijuana use, and cigarette smoking. 81 Most
notably, sensation seeking is greater during adolescence than any other
developmental period.82
Biological science also explains the differences between adult and
adolescent behaviors. Neurological research using magnetic resonance
imaging provides a scientific basis for explaining adolescent behavior.83
Such studies reveal that the adult brain is dramatically different from the
adolescent brain 84 and that the brain of an adolescent continues to develop
well into his or her twenties. 85 Notably, the brain continues to develop into
the twenties in areas relating to judgment and impulse control.86
Researchers have found that the frontal lobe associated with regulating
aggression, long-range planning, abstract thinking, and moral judgment is
not sufficiently developed in adolescents to support these functions. 87
Since adolescents' frontal lobes are not completely developed they tend to
make decisions under the control of the amygdala, which is a part of the
brain associated with impulsive and aggressive behavior.88 Moreover, at
the age of 13 and 14 the major transformation in the brain that enables
adults to exercise cognitive control over their behavior is barely underway,
and certainly not yet developed. 89 Despite such scientific findings, in some
states children as young as 13 are being sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole. This research reflects that young children do not
possess adult biological functionalities, and they, therefore, cannot be as
culpable for their acts as adults.
B. The Effect Ofimpulse Control And Negative Influences On A Child
Children are inherently vulnerable and lack control over their
surroundings. 90 Research indicates that susceptibility to peer influence
81 Arnett, supra note 80, at 1851; see Gerrard, supra note 80, at 107.
82 Arnett, supra note 80, at 1843; see Gerrard, supra note 80, at 107.
83 ABA Report, supra note 44, at 10; Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the
Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCL 77, 77 (2004).
84 ABA Report, supra note 44, at 10; Giedd, supra note 83, at 79.
85 ABA Report, supra note 44, at 10; Giedd, supra note 83, at 79.
86 ABA Report, supra note 44, at 10; Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 339, 366 (1992).
87 ABA Report, supra note 44, at 10; see Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial: The Science of
Neural Development Tangles with the Juvenile Death Penalty, 165 SCIENCE NEWS 299, 299 (2004).
88 ABA Report, supra note 44, at 11; see Bower, supra note 87, at 300.
89 BEATRIZ LUNA, ATTENTION To GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR: NEURODYNAMICAL,
METHODOLOGICAL AND CLINICAL TRENDS 257 (Francisco Aboitiz & Diego Cosmelli eds. 2009); see
Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI.
69, 69 (2005).
90 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v.
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peaks during early adolescence. 91 Research suggests that children are less
sensitive to risk and more sensitive to rewards, which is indicative of
gauging attitudes regarding risk.92 Additionally, children lack an adult's
ability to resist impulses and risk taking behavior. 93 The susceptibility of
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means "their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 94 Accordingly,
the neurological development critical to making sound judgments, moral
and ethical decisions, and controlling impulsive behavior is incomplete
during adolescence. 95
This can be explained partly by the notion that juveniles have less
experience with control over their own environment. 96 Studies centered on
adolescents' susceptibility reflect that parents are more influential in
matters of religion, educational plans, occupational choice, and/or other
"deep" issues, whereas peers are more influential in day-to-day affairs,
such as taste in clothing.97 Notably, studies reflect steady and gradual
increases in adolescents' capacity to escape parental and peer influence
throughout the adolescent years, with gains continuing through the final
years of high school. 98
Children are incredibly vulnerable to the pressures of their peers, older
adolescents, and adults. 99 Peer influence can affect youths' decisions
directly, as when adolescents are coerced to take risks they might otherwise
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 324 (1988) (quoting a 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force on Sentencing Policy toward Young Offenders).
91 See Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early
Adolescence, 57 CHILD. DEV. 841, 846 (1986); see also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
Maturity ofJudgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 249, 254 (1996).
92 See National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brian Research to Inform Policy: A
Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, http://njjn.org/uploads/digital_1ibrary/resource 847.pdf; see also
Neir Eshel et al., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults & Adolescents: Development of the
Ventrolateral Prefrontal & Anterior Cingulate Cortices, 45 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1270, 1270 (2007).
93 See National Juvenile Justice Network, supra note 92; see also Eshel et al., supra note 92, at
1273-74.
94 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
95 See National Juvenile Justice Network, supra note 93; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
570 (2005).
96 Steinberg & Scott, supra note 78, at 1013; see also Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 91, at
263.
97 See Clay V. Brittain, Adolescent Choices & Parent-Peer Cross-Pressures, 28 AM. Soc. REV.
385, 388 (1963); see also Clay V. Brittain, Age and Sex of Siblings and Conformity toward Parents
Versus Peers in Adolescence, 37 CHILD. DEv. 709, 711 (1966).
98 ELLEN GREENBERGER, Education and the Acquisition of Psychosocial Maturity, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MATURITY 155, 169-72 (David C. McClelland ed., 1982).
99 See National Juvenile Justice Network, supra note 93; see also Steinberg & Cauffman, supra
note 91, at 253.
398
DENIAL OF HOPE
avoid. 00 Indirectly, youths may be lead by a desire for peer approval or
fear of rejection, which may lead them to do things they might not
otherwise do.10l However, a study conducted by the Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice Research Foundation found that
vulnerability to peer pressure declined over the course of adolescence and
young adulthood. 102 This decline in vulnerability to peer pressure is
attributable to the maturation process,10 3 which ultimately allows
cognitively developed adolescents and adults to remove themselves from
situations that may be dangerous or morally toxic. While it is true that not
every teen succumbs to peer pressure, it cannot be disputed that many do.
Furthermore, a recent study of seventy-three children serving LWOP in the
United States for crimes they committed at the ages of thirteen and fourteen
found that, "[these children] have been physically and sexually abused,
neglected, and abandoned; their parents are prostitutes, drug addicts,
alcoholics, and crack dealers; they grew up in a lethally violent and
extremely poor areas where health and safety were luxuries their families
could not afford."l04
C. Reform And Rehabilitation
"[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage." 0 5 As aptly stated in United States v. Johnson,106
"[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that
the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the
impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can
subside." The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen a juvenile offender
commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of [his]
most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his
100 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth
Crime, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 15, 20-21 (2008); see also Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 91, at 254.
101 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 100, at 21; see also Steinberg & Cauffinan, supra note 91, at
255.
102 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 100, at 20; see also Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 91. at
254.
103 See L.P Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSC1. & BIOBEHAV. REv. 417 (2000); see also Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age
Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, NAT'L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO.,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2779518.
104 Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 1, at 15.
105 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115 (1982)).
106 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993).
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potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.107
Children, by their very nature, grow and mature into adults. Sentencing a
child to live out his or her entire life in a prison cell robs the child of any
and all potential for growth, change, discovery of him or herself, and the
opportunity to re-enter society as a rehabilitated person." The Court
continued, "[j]uveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and
their actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably depraved
character than are the actions of adults." 08 The Supreme Court has also
discussed an adolescent's ability to change based on developments in
psychology and science, which indicates that brains of adults and children
show fundamental differences.109  These fundamental differences are
bridged during maturation into late adolescence and early adulthood." 0
"[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.
The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, and less fixed."' 1 ' A
psychological study conducted in 2000 examined the psychosocial maturity
of adolescents and adults between the ages of 12 and 48.112 The study
focused on the developmental changes during adolescence in psychological
characteristics that bear on determinations of culpability. The study
hypothesized that responsibility, perspective, and temperance are part of
what is considered "maturity of judgment."11 3 The data was collected from
self-reported questionnaires and was intended to measure responsibility,
perspective, temperance, maturity, and anti-social decision-making. In
these questionnaires, study participants were first presented with different
decision-making scenarios. 14 One such scenario presented read "[y]ou're
out shopping with some of your close friends and they decide to take some
clothing without paying for it. You don't think it's a good idea, but they
say you should take something too."115 Next, participants were presented
with three possible outcome scenarios, 116 one in which, "nothing bad
would happen to you (such as getting arrested) if you took the clothing.
Would you shoplift or would you refuse to take the item?" 11 7 The next
107 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573-574.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amicus Curiae 16-24); Brief for
American Psychological Association et al. as Amicus Curiae 22-27.
110 Id
III Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; see generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
112 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 741.
113 Id. at 752.
114 Id. at 749.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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scenario asks the participant to imagine that something bad would happen,
while the third scenario suggests that the participant doesn't know what
would happen."l 8 For each scenario participants are asked to indicate
whether or not they would engage in the behavior, rating their response on
a four-point scale ranging from "definitely shoplift" to "definitely refuse to
shoplift."1l9 The study revealed that individuals between 12 and 48 differed
significantly in their psychosocial maturity relating to domains of
responsibility, perspective, and temperance.120 As hypothesized by the
study, these domains compose the "maturity of judgment."'21 This maturity
of judgment, while stabilized in adults, develops appreciably up until 19
years of age.122
Additionally, the study found that antisocial decision-making was
strongly influenced by psychosocial maturity rather than age.1 23 Individuals
who are more psychosocially mature, in domains relating to responsibility,
perspective, and temperance, are less likely to make anti-social
decisions.124 Notably, the study revealed that such decision-making tends
to stabilize around 19 years of age.125 However, children as young as 14
and 15 are being sentenced to life in prison without parole before their
decision-making abilities and "maturity of judgment" has stabilized.126 Of
even greater relevance, the study yielded that "the steepest inflection point
in the developmental curve occurs between 16 and 19 years . .. which is
especially true with respect to the development of perspective and
temperance, but less true with regard to the development of responsibility,
which appears to develop more gradually." 27 As the study points out, these
results do not categorically render adolescents irresponsible and
reckless.128 Rather, the "maturity of judgment" measured by responsibility,
temperance, and perspective "are more predictive of anti-social decision
making than chronological age alone."l 29 Though chorological age is not
the strongest predictor of anti-social decision-making, behavioral evidence
indicating that the developmental period between the ages of 16 and 19 is a
118 Id.
119 Id. at 750.
120 Id. at 752.
121 Id. at 756.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 755.
124 Id at 16.
125 Id. at 756.
126 Id
127 Id.
128 Id. at 757.
129 Id.
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crucial transition point in psychosocial development should have great
implications in drawing legal boundaries, for purposes of sentencing,
between adolescence and adulthood.130 The importance of such a study is
that the differences in brain functions between adults and children render
suspect any conclusion that a juvenile is capable of being classified as
among the worst offenders.
Nothing about a child's character is fixed. A child who gives into his or
her impulses or makes unreasoned choices is not a permanently flawed
human being. Rather, this child will still develop biologically, cognitively,
and psychosocially. Since children's characters are not fully established
until adulthood, children have the unique capability to change and to
reform, if provided with that chance. Georgia's Justice Project provides
children with that chance.131 Georgia Justice Project's Approach to
Juvenile Justice Works takes an innovative approach to breaking the cycle
of crime among children in Atlanta. 132 The Georgia Justice Project
incorporates counseling, treatment, and employment and educational
programs in its legal services. 133 The Georgia Justice Project successfully
minimizes recidivism rates among juveniles: the national average is 60%,
but the Georgia Justice Program's recidivism rate is 18.8%.134 This
demonstrates that a unique and holistic approach to juvenile justice actually
works and that children can be reformed. If science, research, and tested
programs like the one in Georgia all indicate that children are less culpable
by the function of biology and environmental cues, then locking children
up in prison and throwing away the key is certainly a disgrace for a society
whose tradition and history is built on protecting the vulnerable. By
imposing LWOP sentences on child offenders, society denies these
children any chance at life. In Graham, the Supreme Court stated that,
"[1]ife without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile.
Under this sentence, a juvenile offender will on average serve more years
and a greater percentage of his life in prison than will an adult offender."1 35
As the Court aptly stated, "[t]his reality cannot be ignored."1 36
Psychological research and biological science support the proposition that
130 Id
131 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 1023; see also Georgia Justice Project, The GJP
Approach, http://www.gjp.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
132 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 1022; see Georgia Justice Project, supra note 131.
133 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 1022; see Georgia Justice Project, supra note 131.
134 See De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 1022; see also Georgia Justice Project, supra
note 131.
135 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
136 Id.
402
DENIAL OF HOPE
children are capable of reform and change; the research does not
distinguish between children who commit homicide offenses and those who
do not.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COMMUNITY POSITION ON
LWOP FOR JUVENILES
The Supreme Court has declared that the Eighth Amendment is an ever-
changing reflection of the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."1 37 The meaning of the Eighth Amendment
"must be interpreted according to its text, by considering history, tradition
and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the
constitutional design."' 38 In 2005, as a result of such evolving standards of
decency, the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty for juveniles by
a 5-4 vote in Roper v. Simmons. 139 Roper represents the idea that the
"special vulnerabilities and frailties of adolescence"' 40 directly reflect on
the degree of personal culpability for Eighth Amendment purposes.141 The
Court applied similar rationales in both Graham and Roper.142 "The
essential feature of the death sentence or a life without parole sentence is
that it imposes a terminal, unchangeable, once and for all judgment upon
the whole life of a human being and declares that human being forever
unfit to be part of a civil society."l 4 3 Roper explained why such a sentence
could not be passed on children below a certain age. Children, by their
very nature, are works-in-progress. In Graham, the Supreme Court stated
that LWOP means, "[d]enial of hope; it means that good behavior and
character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future
might hold in store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in
prison for the rest of his days."144 As reflected by a plethora of behavioral
and psychological evidence, children stand at a particularly vulnerable
point in their lives. In determining that the death penalty and LWOP for
non-homicide offenses for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, the
Supreme Court relied on the inherent differences between children and
137 Id. at 2021 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
138 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
139 See id. at 554.
140 Brief for Petitioner at 28 Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam) (No. 08-
7621).
141 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140.
142 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
143 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 5.
144 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (citing Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526
(1989)).
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adults and the national and international consensus which were opposed to
such a severe penalty. 145 The same rationales employed in Roper and
Graham should extend to juveniles who commit homicide offenses. Since
life in prison without parole is the functional equivalent of the death
penalty, children should be given a second chance despite the crime
committed.
A. The Evolving Standards OfDecency
In Graham, the Supreme Court explored the national consensus in
determining the constitutionality of imposing such a penalty. Professional
organizations, modem science, and leading members of the international
community certainly have reached a consensus regarding sentencing
juveniles to life in prison without parole: it should be prohibited. The
United States stands alone in allowing such a sentence for juvenile
homicide offenders.
In deciding Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court consulted scientific
evidence relating to children's biological and psychosocial development.146
The Court in Roper considered the views expressed by "respected
professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American
heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European
community," 47 and the Court's "own independent judgment." 48 In Roper,
the Court observed that children are inherently different than adults, and
thus must be treated accordingly. It concluded that "today our society
views juveniles . . . as 'categorically less culpable than the average
criminal."' 1 49 Roper rested on the following principles: youthful offenders
are categorically less culpable than the average criminal; youthful offenders
145 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 598 (2005).
146 Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)); Graham, 130 S.
Ct. at 2015.
147 Id. at 561 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
148 Id. at 564.
149 Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). "It is difficult even for expert psychologists to
differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity,
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. As we understand it, this
difficulty underlies the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under [eighteen] as
having antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy, and
which is characterized by callousness, cynicism, and contempt for the feelings, rights, and suffering of
others. If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite
diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under [eighteen] as having antisocial personality
disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation--
that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty. When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime,
the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life
and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity." Id at 573-74 (citations
omitted).
404
DE4IAL OF HOPE
have a tendency to conform and lack maturity; youthful offenders are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures
including peer pressure; and the characters of youthful offenders are not as
well formed while their personality traits are more transitory, and less
fixed.l50 There is a consensus among scientists, psychologists,
psychiatrists, social workers, and child advocates that children are
inherently less culpable due in part to the overwhelming scientific and
behavioral evidence. However, the inquiry must not stop there. The
national and especially the international consensus reflect that LWOP is a
cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile offenders.
In the United States, forty-one states and the federal government permit
life in prison without parole as a sentence for juveniles, while nine states
prohibit such a sentence. 151 The forty-one states that permit such a sentence
are divided yet again on the age at which a child is eligible for LWOP.
Thirteen states permit a child of any age to be sentenced to LWOP and one
sets the bar at eight years or older. 152 Eighteen states apply the sentence to
a child as young as ten years of age and one state permits the sentence at
age twelve.153 Thirteen states set the minimum age at fourteen years. 154
Although the majority of the states permit LWOP for juveniles, several
states that have discretionary sentencing statutes reflect the notion that
children are inherently less culpable and deserve a different sentencing
scheme. In such states, the legislature affords special consideration for
juvenile offenders.155 For example, in Montana a statutory mandatory
minimum does not apply if the offender was under the age of eighteen at
the time he or she committed the crime. 156 Similarly, in Kentucky there are
no restrictions on parole for juveniles.157 Recently, the Colorado legislature
passed an amendment providing that if a person is convicted as an adult,
150 Id. at 569-70,
151 There are seven states which blankly prohibit the imposition of life in prison without parole of
juvenile offenders. These states are: Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, and
Oregon. See De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 30 at 1029; Annino et al., supra note 2; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-222 (2010).
152 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 1029. The thirteen states are as follows: Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Nevada allows juveniles to be sentenced to LWOP as young as
eight.
153 Id. at 1029.
154 Id. at 1029.
155 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010); Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for
Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16
BERKELEY J. OF CRIM. L. 1, 5 (2011).
156 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (2010).
157 Shepherd v. Kentucky, 251 S.W.3d 309, 321 (KY 2008).
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parole is possible after serving forty years.158 The Colorado legislature
reflected modem psychological and scientific evidence when stating that
"because of [children's] level of physical and psychological development,
juveniles who are convicted as adults may, with appropriate counseling,
treatment services, and education, be rehabilitated to a greater extent than
may be possible for adults whose physical and psychological development
is more complete when they commit the crimes."l 59
Graham forecloses states from sentencing juveniles to LWOP for non-
homicide offenses. However, even before the Supreme Court decided
Graham, many states refused to sentence juveniles to LWOP for non-
homicide offenses.160 A recent study found that thirty-six states do not
impose life without parole sentences on juveniles.161 Even though such
sentences are technically permitted by statute in many states, few states
actually utilize the sentencing scheme. The exception is Florida, which has
nearly seventy-seven juveniles serving LWOP for non-homicide
offenses.162 In the United States, one-hundred-nine juveniles are serving
life in prison without parole for non-homicide offenses committed as an
adolescent.163 The breakdown of juveniles serving LWOP for non-
homicide offenses in the United States is as follows: California, four;
Nevada, one; Iowa, six; Louisiana, seventeen; Mississippi, two; Delaware,
one; South Carolina, one; and Florida, seventy-seven.1 64
A 2009 study from The Sentencing Project reported that only 6,807
juveniles are currently serving life sentences and more than half of these
are concentrated in five states.165 However, the Supreme Court has
recognized in Roper and Graham that children are inherently less culpable
This same rationale should be applied to children who commit homicide
offenses. If it's really a question of culpability, then no matter what the
crime, children should be treated differently than adults. These children,
lack the culpability, maturity, and the requisite brain functions responsible
for moral judgments and impulse control and are human works in progress.
158 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b).
159 Victor Streib & Bernadette Schrempp, Life Without Parole for Children, 21 CRIM. JUST. MAG.
4, 8 (2007) (quoting 2006 COLO. LEGIS. SERV. 228 (West)).
160 Annino et al., supra note 2, at 2; Liptak, supra note 3.
161 Annino et al., supra note 2, at 2.
162 Id.; Liptak, supra note 3.
163 Annino et al., supra note 2 at 2; Liptak, supra note 3.
164 Annino et al., supra note 2 at 14; Liptak, supra note 3.
165 ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, No EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA 17 (The Sent'g Project, 2009) (noting that California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and
Nevada contain over 50% of the juveniles serving life sentences); Solomon Moore, Number of Life
Terms Hits Record, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at A24.
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Proponents of imposing LWOP on juveniles point to the retribution
theory of punishment and feel that that the wrongdoer should suffer
because he or she caused the victim to suffer. 166 As stated by the Supreme
Court in Graham, "[s]ociety is entitled to impose severe sanctions on a
juvenile . . . to express its condemnation of the crime and to see restoration
of the moral balance caused by the offense."1 67 However, "at the heart of
the retribution rational is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to
the personal culpability of the criminal offender. Whether viewed as an
attempt to express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right
the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as
strong with a minor. .. ."168 Juvenile offenders will pay their debt to
society, but retribution does not justify imposing LWOP on children;
children are not irreparably damaged human beings; they have the ability to
grow and change. Life in prison without parole categorically dismisses
rehabilitation, which is the backbone of the juvenile court and sentencing
scheme. While this Note does not make light of juveniles who commit
heinous homicide offenses, the overwhelming scientific and neurological
research supports the proposition that children are inherently less culpable
as a function of their developing brain, personality traits, and transitory
character and, therefore, should not be condemned to die in prison.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") has clearly stated its opinions
and desires regarding sentencing children to life in prison without
parole.169 A 2008 ABA report made three recommendations in the
sentencing juveniles: "[y]outh are developmentally different from adults,
and these developmental differences need to be taken into account at all
stages and in all aspects of the adult criminal justice system; [j]udges in the
adult criminal justice system should consider the individual characteristics
of the youth during sentencing; and [t]he collateral consequences normally
attendant to the adult criminal justice process should not necessarily apply
to all youth[s] arrested for crimes committed before the age of eighteen."l 70
The American Bar Association recommendations reflect the national
consensus that children are inherently less culpable, and should be
166 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010); U.S. v. Cole, 622 F. Supp. 2d 632, 637 (N.D.
Ohio 2008).
167 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
168 Id. (quoting Tison v. Ariz, 481 U.S. 137, 139 (1987) & Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571
(2005)).
169 ABA 2008 Report with Recommendations #105C (2008); see also Brief of the American Bar
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2009)
(No. 08-7412, 08-7621).
170 ABA 2008 Report with Recommendations #105C (2008) at 5.
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sentenced in a way different than adult counterparts who commit similar
crimes.171
Despite such recommendations, the United States is now responsible for
all child offenders serving LWOP sentences. 172 Most countries never
allowed, expressly prohibited, or would not practice such sentencing on
child offenders because it violates principles of child development and
international human rights law. 173 As of 2005, then other countries besides
the United States, in theory, permit a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a juvenile offender. These ten countries are as
follows: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Belize, Brunei, Cuba,
Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Solomon Islands, and Sri
Lanka. 174 Importantly, some of the countries that did allow for such a
sentence have since either abolished it or now allow the sentences to be
reviewed to determine whether they were in fact warranted. 175 Notably, in
Graham the Supreme Court emphasized that the United States is the only
country in practice that imposes this type of sentence. 176
The international community recognizes that the special characteristics
of childhood should preclude them from being sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. The international consensus is replete with
evidence that LWOP is a cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on
children. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"), a treaty that has been ratified by every country in the world
except the United States and Somalia, codifies the international norm of
human rights and forbids the imposition of life in prison without parole for
juveniles.177 Article 37(a) of the CRC provides in relevant part that "[n]o
child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment
without possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by
171 Id. at 6.
172 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
173 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 990; see also Molly C. Quinn, Comment: Life
Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders: A Violation of Customary International Law, 52 ST. LOUIs L.J.
283, 283 (2007).
174 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 990. See also Quinn, supra note 173, at 295-296.
175 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 30, at 986; see also Brady J. O'Malley, Graham v. Florida
and the Role of International Sources in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 377, 383-84 (2011).
176 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
177 Convention of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/GC/10, at 1469-70 (Nov. 20, 1989). The Convention of the Rights of the Child can be traced to
the Declaration of Geneva, which was the first international instrument recognizing that children are
entitled to special care and protection. The Declaration stated that "mankind owes to the child the best
that it has to give."
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persons below eighteen years of age."l 78 Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") prohibits cruel, unusual,
and degrading treatment or punishment, and provides that LWOP sentences
are cruel when applied to children. 179 Additionally, such sentences violate
Article 10(3) of the ICCPR, which provides that "[t]he penitentiary system
shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be
their reformation and social rehabilitations.1 80  Article (14)(4) of the
ICCPR requires that when sentencing juvenile persons, governments
"should take into account their age and the desirability of promoting their
rehabilitation." 8 1  Notably, the United States ratified the ICCPR in
1992.182 The Committee on Human Rights determined that in 2006 the
United States was not in compliance with the ICCPR because it allows
LWOP sentence for juveniles.183 Additionally, the United Nations General
Assembly prohibits the imposition of LWOP for children. By a vote of 185
to one, where the United States was the lone vote against, the General
Assembly passed a resolution on December 19, 2006 which requested that
nations "abolish by law, as soon as possible, the death penalty and life
imprisonment without possibility of release for those under the age of 18
years at the time of the commission of the offense." 84 Again in December
of 2007, a similar resolution was passed.185  183 countries ratified.'8 6
178 Id. Article 37 states parties shall ensure that: (b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty
unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with
the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time;
(c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. In
particular, every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the
child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family
through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances; (d) Every child deprived of his or
her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the
right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent
independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action.
179 Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999
U.N.T.S. 1717.
180 Id. at 104.
181 Id. at 107.
182 Jimmy Carter, U.S. Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, June
29, 1992, available at http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/docl369.html.
183 Human Rights Comm., Rep. on its 87th Sess., July 10-28, 2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2395
(July 27, 2006).
184 G.A. Res. 61/146,131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/146 (Dec. 19,2006).
185 G.A. Res. 62/141, 36, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/141, (Dec. 18, 2007); Brief for Amnesty Int'l, et
al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2009) (No. 08-
7412, 80-7621).
186 Brief for Amnesty Int'l, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2009) (No. 08-7412, 80-7621); James 1. Pearce, International Materials and the Eighth
Amendment: Some Thoughts on Method After Graham v. Florida, 21 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 235, 258
(2010).
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Again, the United States was the lone dissenter.187
The international community has spoken. The numerous treaties and
commissions on human rights demonstrate the overwhelming consensus
that LWOP should not be imposed on children. While the Supreme Court
in Graham eliminated LWOP for juvenile offenders who commit non-
homicide crimes, the Court should extend such a decision to juveniles who
commit homicide offenses based on psychological research and the
overwhelming consensus among the international community.
IV. ALTERNATIVES SENTENCING SCHEMES
In recent years, correction systems nationwide have shifted their focus to
alternatives for incarceration of juveniles, even for those who have
committed very serious offenses. There are a number of reasons cited for
the need for alternatives for the incarceration of juveniles, two of which are
the overcrowding of prisons and their lack of effectiveness.188 Studies
conducted between the 1960's and 1990's revealed that community-based
programs, such as group homes, were far more effective in rehabilitating
juveniles than traditional forms of incarceration, such as prison or training
schools.189 In states like Massachusetts,the juvenile corrections system
houses a small number of serious juvenile offenders in a small and secure
facility coupled with an intensive community-based program.190 This
approach has been incredibly effective in reducing recidivism and building
a strong connection between the juvenile and his or her family.191
Similar programs in other states have also been successful. After
187 Brief for Amnesty Int'l, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2009) (No. 08-7412, 80-7621); Pearce, supra note 186, at 258.
188 James Austin, Kelly Dedel Johnson & Ronald Weitzer, Alternatives to Secure Detention and
Confine of Juvenile Offenders, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2-3 (Sept. 2005), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/208804.pdf.; Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Residential Facility
Census,2000: Selected Findings, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 4 (Dec. 2002), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/196595.pdf.; Richard G. Wiebush et al., Implementing and
Outcome Evaluation of the Intensive Aftercare Program, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/206177.pdf.
189 Austin et al., supra note 188; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Guide for
Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 29 (James C. Howell ed., May 1995), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/guide.pdf.
190 Office of Juvenile Justice, supra note 189; Colleen Quinn, DYS: 2005 Program Leads to Drop
among Young Offenders in Custody, STATE HOUSE NEWS SERVICE, I (June 6, 2011), available at
http://66.105.150.81/cgi/as-web.exe?REV201 1+D+6020912.
191 Office of Juvenile Justice, supra note 189; Barry Holman & Jason Ziedenberg, The Dangers of
Detention: The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities, JUSTICE
POLICY INSTITUTE, 16 (Nov. 28, 2006), available at http://www.cfjj.org/Pdfll 16-JPI008-
DODReport.pdf.
410
DENAL OF HOPE
discovering problems of abuse and youth violence, the United States
Department of Justice recommended immediate reform for the Bridge City
Correctional Facility. 192 The death of a child prisoner spurred the reform
which mandates compliance with the Juvenile Justice Reform Act. Bridge
City Detection Center was shut down, 193 and when it reopened, the New
Bridge City Center for Youth no longer treated juvenile inmates like adults,
but rather established a home like environment. 194 The New Center was
focused on therapeutic care and rehabilitation of the child offenders.
Efforts to reform juvenile offenders have also been successful outside
the United States. In the 1970's Germany withdrew traditional sentencing
for juveniles.195 The Juvenile Justice Act was established and provided for
alternative sentencing structures including: suspensions, probation,
community service, and day fines.196 As a result of this new sentencing
scheme, "between [the years of] 1982 and 1990, incarceration of
juveniles . . . decreased by more than 50%."197 Currently, the sentencing
scheme in Germany deals with juvenile (ages fourteen-seventeen)
offenders by educating juveniles and providing for special sanctions. 198
Children are provided with victim offender reconciliation mediation and
educational programs.199 As can be seen, programs aimed at rehabilitation,
rather than incarceration, support the psychological and biological research
that children are capable of reform if given the opportunity.
A. Reforming Juvenile Sentencing Schemes And Policies
LWOP for juveniles is a sentence which "deprives children of both any
hope for return to society and any opportunity for rehabilitation." 200
192 Katy Reckdahl, Bayou Betterment, The American Prospect, 3 (Aug. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=bayou betterment; Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Mike Foster, Governor of Louisiana (July 15, 1996) (on file
with the Department of Justice).
193 Reckdahl, supra note 192; Gwen Filosa, Juvenile Justice in Louisiana Making Transition From
Confinement to Treatment, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, (Feb. 23, 2010, 7:57 PM),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/02/juvenilejustice-in louisiana.html.
194 Reckdahl, supra note 192; Filosa, supra note 193.
195 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 30; Dr. Christian Pfeiffer, Alternative Sanctions in
Germany: an Overview of Germany's Sentencing Practices, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, I (Feb.
1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/germany.pdf.
196 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 30; see also Jugendgerichtsgesetz [hereinafter JGG]
[Juvenile Court/Justice Act], Dec. 11, 1974, [BGBI] 1 at 3427 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-
im-intemet.de/englischjgg/englischjgg.html#p0276 (hereinafter "JGG").
197 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 30 (citing Dr. Christian Pfeiffer, supra note 195 at 1).
198 See id.; see also JGG, supra note 196, at 3427, Part 1, § 1(2).
199 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 30 (citations omitted).
200 Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
Constitutional Disclosure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 162 (2007).
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Consequently, a "sentence must rest on a rational determination that the
punished criminal conduct is so atrocious that society's interest in
deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform
or rehabilitation of the perpetrator." 201 For a juvenile, the possibility of
parole serves an important rehabilitative function. 202 The Supreme Court
has stated that the "ultimate purpose of parole ... [is] the long-range
objective of rehabilitation." 203 Sentencing a juvenile offender to LWOP
serves absolutely no rehabilitative function.204 Rather, this sentence is a
"denial of hope." 205
Additionally, those jurisdictions that sentence juveniles to thirty or forty
years of imprisonment, in place of LWOP, still do not alleviate the issues
with such excessive sentencing schemes. The scientific evidence, as
discussed above, highlights that children are inherently less culpable than
adults and that there brain develops well into their twenties. Children
sentenced to thirty or forty years will still be incarcerated long after their
brain has matured, their idea of right and wrong is stabilized, and their
ability to grasp the consequences of their actions is developed. This
evidence, coupled with success in Georgia, Massachusetts, California, and
Louisiana highlights the need for a reform in juvenile sentencing. A
holistic approach to juvenile incarceration should be adopted which takes
into account modern psychological research. This new approach should
recognize that children are capable of reform, are works-in progress, and
with proper rehabilitation, should be permitted to renter society.
CONCLUSION
The Graham decision was certainly a step forward in reforming the
juvenile justice system to reflect modern psychological and biological
understandings. However, the decision in Graham does not extend to
juveniles who commit homicide offenses. Therefore, it is foreseeable that
the rationales underlying Graham will be employed to petition the Supreme
Court to hold that life in prison without parole is an unconstitutional
201 Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 34, Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2009) (No. 08-7412, 08-7621).
202 See e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979);
see also Dutra v. Curry, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35902, *18-19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008).
203 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13.
204 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1028 (1991); see also U.S. v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082,
1085 (1998).
205 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2042 (2010) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525,
526, 779 P.2d 944 (1989)).
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sentence for juvenile homicide offenders. The Supreme Court in Graham
failed to recognize that psychological and biological science applies to all
juveniles, not just those who commit non-homicide offenses. The
international community has spoken: such a sentence is cruel and unusual,
despite the offense committed.A sentence of LWOP denies the child
homicide offender of any hope of reform or rehabilitation and, while "life
is over for the victim of the murderer," 206 "[i]ncapacitation cannot override
all other considerations." 207
206 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2072.
207 Id. at 2029.
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